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Volume 1: Issue 2
Complex Economics and Patent Remedies
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson’s 1990 article On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope1 focuses attention on patent rights’ capacity to slow innovative progress by “taxing” 
or otherwise impeding the activities of follow-on innovators.2 They argue that such dynamic 
“drag” from patent rights3 can be especially problematic with respect to “cumulative 
WHFKQRORJLHVµZKLFKPLJKWEHFUXGHO\GHVFULEHGDVWHFKQRORJLHVLQZKLFKVLJQLÀFDQW
advances tend to involve a multiplicity of substantially novel features.4 Broad patent 
scope can decelerate the development of such a technology by “reduc[ing] competition in 
the market for improvements to the patented technology.”5 The result can be a relatively 
“sluggish” rate of further technological advance.6
Current debates over the proper remedies for patent infringement have a strong relation to 
0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQ·VFRQFHUQVZLWKSRWHQWLDOG\QDPLFLQHIÀFLHQFLHVRISDWHQWULJKWV2QH
not-so-subtle insight underlying modern remedies debates is that, even if follow-on activity 
infringes a patent’s scope, the patent might do little to limit that activity if remedies for patent 
LQIULQJHPHQWDUHVXIÀFLHQWO\OLPLWHG,IFRXUWVUDUHO\LVVXHLQMXQFWLRQVWRHQIRUFHSDWHQWVDQG
UDUHO\LVVXHGDPDJHDZDUGVWKDWDUHPRUHWKDQDVPDOOIUDFWLRQRIDQLQIULQJHU·VSURÀWVHYHQ
EURDGSDWHQWVRQIXQGDPHQWDOLQQRYDWLRQVPLJKWQRWVLJQLÀFDQWO\FKLOOIROORZRQLQQRYDWLRQ
The complementary nature of Merges and Nelson’s concern with patent scope and present-
day concerns with patent remedies recalls an old lesson: the breadth of legal entitlements 
*/RRPHU)DPLO\3URIHVVRULQ/DZ8QLYHUVLW\RI7H[DV6FKRRORI/DZ,ZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQNWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
LQDQGWKHRUJDQL]HUVRIWKH6HSWHPEHU3DWHQW6FRSH5HYLVLWHG&RQIHUHQFHDW,QGLDQD8QLYHUVLW\0DXUHU
School of Law.
1. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 
(1990).
2. See id. at 907 (describing patentees who license broadly and indiscriminately “as tollkeepers, not coordina-
tors”).
3. See John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for the Promotion of Prog-
ress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2010) (presenting “a model for innovative progress in which the rate 
of progress is determined by a combination of accelerant ‘pushes’ and decelerant ‘drags’”).
4. See Merges & Nelson, supraQRWHDW´,QPDQ\FDVHV>DFXPXODWLYH@WHFKQRORJ\GHÀQHVDFRPSOH[
system with many components, subcomponents and parts, and technical advance may proceed on a number of 
different fronts at once.”).
5. Id. at 843.
6. Id. at 908.
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7. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 307 (4th ed. 2010) (describing two traditions 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVFRSHRILQMXQFWLYHUHOLHI´WKHULJKWIXOSRVLWLRQDSSURDFKµDQG´WKHHTXLWDEOHGLV-
cretion approach,” with an “academic formulation” of the latter “claim[ing] that, at least in public law litiga-
WLRQ¶ULJKWDQGUHPHG\DUHSUHWW\WKRURXJKO\GLVFRQQHFWHG·µTXRWLQJ$EUDP&KD\HVThe Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (1976)).
*XLGR&DODEUHVL	$'RXJODV0HODPHGProperty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
9. Id.DW´:KHQHYHUVRPHRQHPD\GHVWUR\WKHLQLWLDOHQWLWOHPHQWLIKHLVZLOOLQJWRSD\DQREMHFWLYHO\
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”).
10. Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 883.
11. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1118 (“Wherever transactions between [two parties of concern] 
DUHHDV\DQGZKHUHYHUHFRQRPLFHIÀFLHQF\LVRXUJRDOZHFRXOGHPSOR\HQWLWOHPHQWVSURWHFWHGE\SURS-
erty rules even though we would not be sure that the entitlement chosen was the right one.  Transactions . . . 
would cure the error.”).
12. Id.DWGHVFULELQJWKHSURMHFWEHLQJXQGHUWDNHQDVRQHRI´KRZWRH[HUFLVHGLVFUHWLRQµLQUHODWLRQWR
doctrines regulating patent scope).
13. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
14. Id.DW´:HKROGRQO\WKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWRJUDQWRUGHQ\LQMXQFWLYHUHOLHIUHVWVZLWKLQWKHHT-
uitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
SULQFLSOHVRIHTXLW\µ
and the remedies for their violation can be viewed as separately tunable factors in the 
achievement of social goals.7 Concern with patent scope can be associated with Guido 
&DODEUHVLDQG'RXJODV0HODPHG·V´SUREOHPRI¶HQWLWOHPHQW·µWKHTXHVWLRQRI´ZKLFK
side to favor” in a legal dispute.8 Concern with patent remedies can be associated with 
&DODEUHVLDQG0HODPHG·VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHFKRLFHEHWZHHQDQREMHFWLYHO\FRPSHQVDWRU\
´OLDELOLW\UXOHµDQGDQDOWHUQDWLYH´SURSHUW\UXOHµDTXHVWLRQDERXW´WKHPDQQHULQZKLFK
entitlements are protected.”9
*LYHQWKHFRPSOHPHQWDU\QDWXUHRITXHVWLRQVDERXWSDWHQWVFRSHDQGTXHVWLRQVDERXW
patent remedies, what does Merges and Nelson’s article suggest about how to resolve 
debates over the latter?  First, Merges and Nelson’s discussion of distinct technology 
and industry types indicates that, like doctrines regulating patent scope, doctrines 
governing patent remedies will likely have distinct, context-dependent effects on different 
technologies’ rates of innovative progress.  Just as a “tradition of licensing” within a 
given economic sector might “mitigat[e] the potential impact of broad patents,”10 such a 
tradition might alleviate concerns that robust property-rule remedies will lead to socially 
undesirable outcomes.11 Thus, Merges and Nelson’s argument that courts should use 
“discretion” to determine patent scope in a way that is sensitive to technological and 
industrial context12 seems readily extendable to debates over patent remedies.
$VZLWKSDWHQWVFRSHFRXUWVKDYHPDQ\ZD\VLQZKLFKWKH\FDQUHJXODWHSDWHQW
UHPHGLHV,QeBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,13 the Supreme Court reemphasized the 
GLVFUHWLRQWKDWGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJHVKDYHLQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWRJUDQWRUWRGHQ\LQMXQFWLYH
relief.14&RXUWVDOVRKDYHVXEVWDQWLDOGLVFUHWLRQLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHVFRSHRIWKHLQMXQFWLRQV
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,QW·O5HFWLÀHU&RUSY6DPVXQJ(OHFV&R)G)HG&LU´'LVWULFWFRXUWVKDYH
EURDGGLVFUHWLRQLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHVFRSHRILQMXQFWLYHUHOLHIµSee generally Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 
86´7KHHVVHQFHRIHTXLW\MXULVGLFWLRQKDVEHHQWKHSRZHURIWKH&KDQFHOORUWRGRHTXLW\
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.”).
16. See, e.g., ,QW·O5HFWLÀHU)GDW´>:@HUHYLHZDGLVWULFWFRXUW·VÀQGLQJRIFRQWHPSWRIDQLQMXQF-
tion, by infringement, for an abuse of discretion . . . .”).
17. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir.) (“Given the intensely factual nature 
of a damages determination and our deferential standard of review, we are not in a position to second-guess or 
VXEVWLWXWHRXUMXGJPHQWIRUWKHMXU\·Vµcert. granted on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
18. Id. at 852 (“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”); see also6(%6$Y0RQWJRPHU\
:DUG	&R)G)HG&LU´'LVWULFWFRXUWVHQMR\ZLGHODWLWXGHWRGHWHUPLQHDGPLV-
VLELOLW\DQGWKHPRGHDQGRUGHURIHYLGHQWLDU\SUHVHQWDWLRQVµLQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHGcf. Uniloc 
86$,QFY0LFURVRIW&RUS1RVVOLSRSDW)HG&LU-DQ´(YLGHQFHUHO\-
ing on the 25 percent rule of thumb [for a reasonable royalty] is . . . inadmissible . . . because it fails to tie a 
reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”).
19. Compare SEB)GDW´7KHYHUGLFWIRUPLWVHOIVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHMXU\ZDVDVNHGWREDVHLWVGDP-
ages calculations on inducement only.”), with id.´2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHMXU\LQVWUXFWLRQVDOVRLQGLFDWHWKDW
WKHMXU\FRXOGDVVHVVGDPDJHVIRUGLUHFWLQIULQJHPHQWµ
20. See5HV41HWFRP,QFY/DQVD,QF)G)HG&LU´%HFDXVHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·V
[damages] award relied on speculative and unreliable evidence divorced from proof of economic harm linked 
WRWKHFODLPHGLQYHQWLRQDQGLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKVRXQGGDPDJHVMXULVSUXGHQFHWKLVFRXUWYDFDWHVWKHGDPDJHV
DZDUGDQGUHPDQGVµ,QDVSDQRIWZR\HDUVWKH86&RXUWRI$SSHDOVIRUWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWKDVYDFDWHG
PXOWLSOHMXU\DZDUGVLQSDWHQWFDVHVSee:RUGWHFK6\V,QFY,QWHJUDWHG1HWZRUNV6ROXWLRQV,QF
)G)HG&LU´%HFDXVHWKH>MXU\·V@YHUGLFWZDVFOHDUO\QRWVXSSRUWHGE\WKHHYLGHQFHDQG
based only on speculation or guesswork, we reverse . . . and remand for a new trial on damages.” (internal 
FLWDWLRQDQGTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG/XFHQW7HFKV,QFY*DWHZD\,QF)G)HG&LU
´:HDJUHHZLWK0LFURVRIW·VDUJXPHQWWKDWVXEVWDQWLDOHYLGHQFHGRHVQRWVXSSRUWWKHMXU\·VYHUGLFW
of a lump-sum royalty payment of $357,693,056.18.”).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or as-
sessed.”); see also i4i)GDW´$ÀQGLQJRIZLOOIXOLQIULQJHPHQWLVDSUHUHTXLVLWHWRWKHDZDUGRI
enhanced damages.”).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.”); see also,&80HG,QFY$ODULV0HG6\V,QF)G)HG&LU´+DYLQJ
determined that this case is exceptional, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees . . . .”).
23. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under some circumstances, 
DZDUGLQJDQRQJRLQJUR\DOW\IRUSDWHQWLQIULQJHPHQWLQOLHXRIDQLQMXQFWLRQPD\EHDSSURSULDWHµ
that they issue,15DQGLQGHWHUPLQLQJKRZWRHQIRUFHWKRVHLQMXQFWLRQVWKURXJKFRQWHPSW
proceedings.16$OWKRXJKGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIGDPDJHVLVW\SLFDOO\DTXHVWLRQIRUMXULHV17 a 
district court can do much to regulate the evidence and experts,18 as well as the instructions 
and verdict forms,19WKDWLQIRUPMXULHV·GHFLVLRQV0RUHRYHUFRXUWVFDQYDFDWHDZDUGVRI
damages that they believe to lack reasonable support in the evidence.20 Finally, courts have 
VLJQLÀFDQWFRQWURORYHUVSHFLDOIRUPVRIGDPDJHV$IWHUDMXU\PDNHVDÀQGLQJRIZLOOIXO
infringement, a district court has discretion to decide by what factor—from one to three—to 
multiply compensatory damages.21 Likewise, district courts have power to award attorney 
fees “in exceptional cases.”22:KHQDGLVWULFWFRXUWGHQLHVDSHUPDQHQWLQMXQFWLRQWKHFRXUW
can award an “ongoing royalty.”23
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24. See Merges & Nelson, supraQRWHDW´2IFRXUVHWKHUHDUHSDWHQWVXLWVDQGVKRUWWHUPKROGXSVLQ
WKHÀHOGRIEXONFKHPLFDOSURFHVVWHFKQRORJ\EXWWKHVHSUREOHPVDUHXVXDOO\VHWWOHGDQGOLFHQVLQJLVDJHQHUDO
practice.”); see also id. at 883 (describing a “tradition of licensing” as “mitigat[ing] the potential impact of 
broad patents”).  See generally id. at 908 (stating a “basic conclusion” that, particularly with respect to “cu-
mulative technologies,” “multiple and competitive sources of invention are socially preferable”).
25. Id. at 880-81.
26. Id. at 916.
27. Id. at 843.
28. Various recent congressional bills have, for example, proposed blanket adoption of a single standard ap-
proach for calculating reasonable-royalty damages that might be viewed as grasping at such an ideal.  See 
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 582-86 (2010) (discussing legislative 
proposals relating to damage awards for patent infringement).
+RZVKRXOGFRXUWVXVHWKHLUSRZHUWRUHJXODWHSDWHQWUHPHGLHV"([WUDSRODWLRQIURP
Merges and Nelson’s analysis regarding patent scope suggests that welfare-maximizing 
DQVZHUVVKRXOGEHVHQVLWLYHWRWHFKQRORJLFDQGLQGXVWULDOFLUFXPVWDQFH,QLQGXVWULHV
with a well-established and generally pervasive culture of licensing on reasonable terms, 
relatively strong patent remedies might not present much of a barrier to the competitive 
markets for innovation that Merges and Nelson generally favor.24 Likewise, with respect to 
technologies in which individual innovations tend “not [to] point the way to wide ranging 
VXEVHTXHQWWHFKQLFDODGYDQFHVµVWURQJUHPHGLHVWKDWJLYH´DSURSULHWDU\ORFNRQWKH
LQYHQWLRQµPLJKWQRW´VHULRXV>O\@KLQG>HU@LQYHQWLYHZRUNE\PDQ\RWKHUÀUPVµ25
5HJDUGLQJPRUHVSHFLÀFTXHVWLRQVRIKRZFRXUWVVKRXOGFUDIWRUFXUWDLOSDWHQWUHPHGLHV
Merges and Nelson’s ultimately moderate approach to restricting patent scope might 
suggest a similarly moderate policy of curtailing remedies in a limited number of relatively 
extreme situations, ones in which patent rights threaten to severely damp competitive or 
LQQRYDWLYHDFWLYLW\0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQVWUHVVWKDWWKHLUSURSRVHG´GRFWULQDOPRGLÀFDWLRQV
. . . will apply only to the broader claims of a small number of patents, primarily those 
on pioneering breakthroughs.”26 They contend that, “[w]ithout extensively reducing 
the pioneer’s incentives, the law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive 
environment for improvements.”27 Merges and Nelson thus appear to have faith that, by 
acting to forestall or to eliminate a relatively discrete set of competitive bottlenecks, patent-
law decision-makers can do much good while doing comparatively little harm.  They 
hesitate to suggest much more broad-based interventions.
The modesty of Merges and Nelson’s policy proposals contrasts with the dramatic 
nature of some recent calls for sweeping overhaul of patent remedies, calls that at least 
sometimes seem to chase a goal of remedies measured with Swiss-watch-like precision.28 
Such reforms would likely be benign if they matched up well with the competences of 
MXGJHVDQGMXULHV,QWKHDEVHQFHRIFRQFHUQIRUFRVWRUSRVVLEOHMXGJHRUMXU\HUURU
DGRSWLRQRIOHJDOUXOHVWKDWGHPDQGH[DFWSUHFLVLRQLQWKHDZDUGRIHTXLWDEOHRUPRQHWDU\
UHPHGLHVPLJKWVHHPPHUHO\MXVW,QWKHDEVWUDFWWKHUHPLJKWEHOLWWOHDSSDUHQWUHDVRQWR
RSSRVHOHJDOUHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWDFRXUWLVVXHDQLQMXQFWLRQLIDQGRQO\LIWKHPRYDQW
29. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 FPWD´$SDUW\ZKRKDVE\KLVEUHDFKIRUFHGWKHLQMXUHG
SDUW\WRVHHNFRPSHQVDWLRQLQGDPDJHVVKRXOGQRWEHDOORZHGWRSURÀWIURPKLVEUHDFKZKHUHLWLVHVWDE-
OLVKHGWKDWDVLJQLÀFDQWORVVKDVRFFXUUHG'DPDJHVQHHGQRWEHFDOFXODEOHZLWKPDWKHPDWLFDODFFXUDF\
and are often at best approximate.”); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3(8), at 317 (2d ed. 1993) 
´$FFXUDF\LQPHDVXUHPHQWLVDGHVLUDEOHJRDOEXWLWVKRXOGQRWOHDGXVWRIRUJHWWKHGHÀQLWLRQDODQGSROLF\
elements involved, nor the limits of the enterprise.”).
&KHYURQ86$,QFY1DWXUDO5HV'HI&RXQFLO86KROGLQJWKDWZKHUH&RQ-
gress has implicitly delegated interpretive power to an agency, “a court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of [the] agency”).
)&&Y%HDFK&RPPF·QV,QF86´,QDUHDVRIVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFSROLF\D
VWDWXWRU\FODVVLÀFDWLRQWKDWQHLWKHUSURFHHGVDORQJVXVSHFWOLQHVQRULQIULQJHVIXQGDPHQWDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWV
PXVWEHXSKHOGDJDLQVWHTXDOSURWHFWLRQFKDOOHQJHLIWKHUHLVDQ\UHDVRQDEO\FRQFHLYDEOHVWDWHRIIDFWVWKDW
FRXOGSURYLGHDUDWLRQDOEDVLVIRUWKHFODVVLÀFDWLRQµ
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTSFPWF´,QDGHTXDF\RIFRQVLGHUDWLRQGRHVQRWRILWVHOILQYDOL-
date a bargain, but gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that 
DFRQWUDFWLVXQFRQVFLRQDEOHDQGPD\EHVXIÀFLHQWJURXQGZLWKRXWPRUHIRUGHQ\LQJVSHFLÀFSHUIRUPDQFHµ
see also id. at § 208 cmt. b (“Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if it 
was ‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and 
fair man would accept on the other.’”).
33. See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2149 n.138 (2007) (sug-
JHVWLQJWKDWFRXUWVPLJKWGHQ\LQMXQFWLRQV´LQFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHUHWKHFRVWVRIKDOWLQJLQIULQJHPHQWJUHDWO\
exceed both (a) reasonable estimates of the positive value of the infringement and (b) any harm to the right 
holder other than its failure to recover from the infringer the positive value of infringement or the negative 
value associated with the cost of terminating infringement”).
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KDVSURYLGHGGHFLVLYHSURRIWKDWWKHLQMXQFWLRQLVRQQHWVRFLDOO\GHVLUDEOHDQGFRXUW
DZDUGHGFRPSHQVDWRU\GDPDJHVUHÁHFWDQH[DFWDVVHVVPHQWRIKRZPXFKDGGLWLRQDOYDOXH
was added to a product or process by its infringing aspects.  
But in one legal area after another, the law has recognized that courts cannot be expected 
WRDFWVRSUHFLVHO\,QGHHGLWKDVORQJEHHQDSSUHFLDWHGWKDWSUHWHQVLRQVDWSUHFLVLRQFDQ
generate not only wasteful cost but even systematically inferior outcomes.29 Hence, courts 
IUHTXHQWO\KDYHJUDYLWDWHGWRZDUGZD\VRIUHVROYLQJOHJDOGLVSXWHVWKDWDYRLGGHPDQGV
for absolute precision.  For example, in reviewing an administrative agency’s legal 
understandings,30 Congress’s economic policy choices,31 or the validity of a contract of 
doubtful fairness,32 courts commonly focus not on whether the relevant legal understanding, 
policy choice, or contractual arrangement is optimal, but instead on whether it is in some 
VHQVHJURVVO\ZURQJ7KHLQWXLWLRQVHHPVWREHWKDWFRXUWVFDQGRVLJQLÀFDQWJRRGE\
picking out extreme cases of error or dysfunction even when they are incompetent to 
JLYHSUHFLVHDQVZHUVRQTXHVWLRQVRIRSWLPDOLW\RUYDOXH0HUJHVDQG1HOVRQ·VPHDVXUHG
policy prescriptions comport with a corresponding intuition that courts might best focus on 
DYRLGLQJJURVVO\GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHUHPHGLHVUDWKHUWKDQHQJDJLQJLQWKHTXL[RWLFSXUVXLWRI
absolutely precise ones.33
6ZHHSLQJUHIRUPLVVRPHWLPHVEHQHÀFLDORUHYHQQHFHVVDU\%XWDWWLPHVDFDUHIXO
incremental shift can resolve foreseeable problems with much less risk of great, unintended 
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34. See Golden, supraQRWHDWQRWLQJLQGXVWU\OREE\LQJHIIRUWVUHODWLQJWRTXHVWLRQVRIGDPDJHVIRU
patent infringement).
harm.  Further, a small change today can prepare the way for a more substantial 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQWRPRUURZ$VWKHZHOOIXQGHGFODPRUIRULPPHGLDWHGUDPDWLFUHIRUPRI
patent remedies continues,34 the moderation of Merges and Nelson’s policy prescriptions 
might be worth keeping in mind.
